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ARMED FORCES: SEX-BASED DRAFT VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION- United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. 1060 (D.
Mont. 1975).
Congress is mandated by the Constitution "to raise and support
Armies,"' "to provide and maintain a Navy," 2 "to make rules for the
Government and Regulation of the Land and Naval Forces," ' and
"to provide for organizing, arming, and discipling the Militia...
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress." 4 The power of Congress to conscript can
be supported by the necessary and proper clause as a justifiable
means for execution of the Art. I, §8 mandates. Although the power
of Congress to raise and maintain armies is beyond dispute,5
whether the exercise of those powers enables Congress to conscript
only male citizens and thereby exclude the conscription of females
is questionable. Can an argument be made that such a distinction
is a violation of equal protection or that no rational basis exists for
such a classification? Previous challenges to the Selective Service
Act' based on violations of equal protection have been disallowed by
holdings which maintained that Congress had a rational basis for
discriminating against one sex.7 These courts uniformly applied the
rational basis test.
In United States v. Reiser,8 the defendant was indicted under
50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) for failing to report for induction. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. His position was premised upon the
theory that sex-based classifications are inherently suspect, and
therefore, must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.
Defendant contended that the government had no such interest.
Against a long line of precedent, the District Court of Montana
1.
2.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.

3. U.S.

CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl. 14.

4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
5. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See also Litcher v. United States, 334
U.S. 742 (1948); Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918)(Selective Service Cases).
6. 50 U.S.C. App. § 453 (1968):
•It shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every other
male person now or hereafter in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for
the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twentysix, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place
or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President
and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder. (Emphasis added)
7. United States v. Baechler, 509 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Betram, 477
F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Camara, 451 F.2d 1122 (1st Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
8. 394 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Mont. 1975).
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(Ninth Circuit) held that legislation limiting the draft to male citizens denies to them due process and equal protection of the law in
violation of the fifth amendment.' The Reiser court abandoned the
older rational basis test and instead applied a test of strict judicial
scrutiny holding that the former test was inapplicable where a fundamental interest or a suspect classification 0 is involved.
The Reiser court adopted the strict scrutiny test on the basis
that sex is a suspect classification, but did not address itself to the
question of whether the rights of the defendant which were being
abridged, were fundamental." According to the court, "Suspect
classifications are based upon a person's status. The more immutable the characteristics are upon which the classification is based, the
more likely they will be held to be suspect.' ' 2 Such characteristics
are those over which we have no control; those things which genetics
and heredity impose upon us, such as race and physical features.
The case should not turn upon which standard the court is
willing to adopt since under either test the Selective Service Act
could not meet the requirements of constitutionality. Although the
Reiser court held sex to be a suspect classification, and therefore
applied the strict scrutiny test, a persuasive argument can be made
for holding the legislation unconstitutional under the more tradi9. While the fifth amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is so "unjustified as to be violative of due process." Schneider v. Rusk, 377
U.S. 163, 168 (1964), citing Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
10. Suspect classifications have been described as groups which are in special need of
protection because they are "discrete and insular minorities." United States v. Caroline Prod.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938).
11. Although not all fundamental interests are constitutionally guaranteed, the determination of which interests are fundamental should be firmly rooted in the text of
the Constitution. The task in every case should be to determine the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned in the
Constitution.
Justice Marshall's dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 102 (1973). See Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal
Protection, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 807 (1973). Thus, determinations of fundamental interests
appear to be based on a historical perspective. No clear standard has been announced for
deciding what is and what is not fundamental. The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue
on a case-by-case basis. The following cases reveal which rights have been declared fundamental: Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)(right of interstate travel); Sherbet v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)(religion); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)(criminal appeals);
Harper v. Virginia Bd.of Electors, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)(voting); Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960)(freedom of association); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(marriage);
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)(procreation). It was not necessary for the Reiser court to find a fundamental interest since a suspect classification was
found.
12. 394 F. Supp. at 1063; see generally Note, Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1126-27 (1969). See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
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tional rational basis test. In order to understand this possibility it
is necessary to compare the two tests and the Reiser court's opinion.
The rational basis test requires the government to provide a
rational justification for a statutory classification.'" Since every legislative enactment carries a rebuttable presumption of constitutionality,' 4 the burden is on the person challenging the legislation to
prove that there is no correlation between the classification and the
objective to be obtained. Under the rationalbasis test courts require
that the "classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relationship to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."'"
The Reiser court believed that sex-based classifications are,
like racial classifications, the result of long-standing stereotyped
determinations concerning the worth or abilities of a group and, as
such, arbitrary.'" The court referred to a number of Supreme Court
decisions in determining what type of classifications were suspect.
Just as the Supreme Court has refused to let stand classifications
based on race," alienage,'8 and national origin," the Reiser court felt
that placing a burden on a sex group was immediately suspect since
such a classification was not related to merit. 0 The court recognized
a persuasive analogy between race and sex classifications." It found
13. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), involved a suit which contested Maryland's Blue Laws. The court set as a criteria for review of statutes, under the "rational basis"
test, whether "any set of facts may be conceived to justify it." Id. at 426. The "constitutional
safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective." Id. at 425.
14. Id. at 425-26.
15. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
16. See Comment, Are Sex Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw.
U.L. REV. 481 (1971).
17. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
18. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915).
19. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
20. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065
(1969).
21.- The similarities between race and sex discrimination are indeed striking.
Both classifications create large, natural classes, membership in which is beyond the
individual's control; both are highly visible characteristics on which legislators have
found it easy to draw gross, stereotypical distinctions. Historically, the legal position
of black slaves was justified by analogy to the legal status of women. Both slaves and
wives were once subject to the all-encompassing paternalistic power of the male head
of the house. Arguments justifying different treatment for the sexes on grounds of
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that like race, sex is subject to overbroad generalizations based on
visible differentness. 2
Although judicial standards for determining which classifications are suspect have not as yet been clearly articulated, the Reiser
court felt it was justified in applying to sexual classifications the
same standard as that applied to race. Like race, sex-based classifications are characterized by the stigma of inferiority and second
3
class citizenship associated with them.
The Reiser court found support for labeling sex as a suspect
classification in the case of Frontiero v.Richardson.24 In that case,
the Court divided equally on the issue of whether sex is a suspect
classification. According to Justice Brennan,
• . .[Any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the
sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience,
necessarily commands "dissimilar treatment for men and women
who are . . .similarly situated," and therefore involves the "very

kind of legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution] .... "I'
Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based
classifications .26
The Reiser court's decision to hold sex as an inherently suspect
classification is not compelled by Frontierosince there was no clear
majority in that regard. Justice Powell, the Chief Justice and Jusfemale inferiority, need for male protection, and happiness in their assigned roles bear
a striking resemblance to the half-truths surrounding the myth of the "happy slave."
The historical patterns of race and sex discrimination have, in many instances, produced similar present day results. Women and blacks, for example, hold the lowest
paying jobs in industry, with black men doing slightly better than white women.
Note, Sex Discriminationand Equal Protection:Do We Need a ConstitutionalAmendment?,
84 HARv. L. REv. 1499, 1507-08 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
22. See note 16 supra.
23. See note 21 supra.
24. 411 U.S. 677 (1972). Frontiero declared unconstitutional a federal statute which
allowed male armed service members to collect additional allowances and benefits for their
wives regardless of dependency, but required female armed service members to prove their
husband's dependency before receiving such allowances and benefits.
25. Id. at 690, citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 77 (1971).
26. Id. at 687:
In Tit. VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, Congress expressly declared
that no employer, labor union, or other organization subject to the provisions of the
Act shall discriminate against any individual on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex
or national origin." Similarly, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 provides that no employer
covered by the Act "shall discriminate ...
between employees on the basis of sex."
And §1 of the Equal Rights Amendment, passed by Congress on March 22, 1972, and
submitted to the legislatures of the States for ratification, declares that "[e]quality
of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of sex." Thus, Congress itself has concluded that classifications based
upon sex are inherently invidious . . . .(footnotes omitted)
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tice Blackmun felt compelled to refrain from invoking the strictest
test of judicial scrutiny due to a belief in the imminent ratification
of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. If the amendment is
adopted, it will represent the will of the people. A court decision
finding sex to be an inherently suspect classification would be premature according to these two Justices. To hold all sexual classifications as inherently suspect might open a Pandora's box of questions.
Such an expanded version of the equal protection clause may obviate the need of an Equal Rights Amendment as Justice Powell and
Blackmun observed in Frontiero.
Under the strict scrutiny test the burden is upon the government to show a compelling interest if the legislation is to be sustained.2 7 Such a burden is almost impossible to meet. The distinctions drawn by the law must be of such a compelling nature that
not even protected constitutional rights can withstand its purpose.
The Selective Service Act could not meet such a test.
It would be possible to argue the unconstitutionality of the
Selective Service Act using the rational basis test without encountering all the problems that might ultimately arise by holding sex a
suspect classification. For example, the Reiser court could have
asked: what constitutionally permissible objective might the
Selective Service Act and other relevant statutory materials be construed to reflect? A presumption of constitutionality evidencing
considerable judicial restraint would be in keeping with the rational
basis test.
Previous cases had placed emphasis on women's unique place
in society. In United States v. Clair,8 sex discrimination in the
military was upheld because:
• . . Congress made a legislative judgment that men should be subject to involuntary induction but that women, presumably because
they are "still regarded as the center of the home and family life"...
should not. Women may constitutionally be afforded "special recognition" . . . particularly since women are not excluded from service
in the Armed Forces ....
In providing for involuntary service for men and voluntary service for women, Congress followed the teachings of history that if a
nation is to survive, men must provide the first line of defense while
women keep the home fires burning: (citations omitted)
27.

See note 24 supra.

28.

291 F. Supp. 122, 124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also United States v. Yingling, 368

F. Supp. 379 (W.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Dorris, 319 F. Supp. 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1970);
United States v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1969).
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This type of stereotyped portrayal of women in society is no longer
valid. The Supreme Court in Stanton v. Stanton,29 declared:
No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing
of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world
of ideas . .

.

.Women's activities and responsibilities are increasing

and expanding. Coeducation is a fact not a rarity. The presence of
women in business, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in
all walks of life where education is desirable, if not always a necessary
antecedent, is apparent and a proper subject of judicial notice.
Taylor v. Louisiana0 revealed that, in 1974, 54 per cent of all women
between 18 and 64 years of age were in the labor force. The nineteenth century conception of women's "separate place" is completely outdated. 3 If such concepts are no longer tenable, then the
justification for such legislation no longer rests upon a rational
basis. "
Formerly, under the rational basis test, invoking a claim of
national security was enough to give judicial approval to the allmale draft.31 However, even under this criterion, the government
should be required to show more than a mere claim of national
security. It must give some specific indication of how national
security would be affected. The government could not establish a
rational basis which would justify a draft drawn solely on sex lines.
The arguments set forth by the government in Reiser are not
persuasive. The government argued that such a classification was
justified on the basis of physical differences, especially in regard to
the relative strengths of the sexes. Formerly, hand-to-hand combat
was a necessary part of war. Therefore, strength was a compelling
29. 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975).
30. 95 S. Ct. 692, 700, n. 17 (1975).
31. Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), held that gender-based distinctions
mandated by the Social Security Act, § 202(g), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(g) (1950), were
overbroad and archaic generalizations since they were based on the premise that male workers' earnings are vital to their families' support, while female workers' earnings do not significantly contribute to families' support. The statute, therefore, violates due process since it
unjustifiably discriminates against women wage earners. The gender-based distinction made
by § 402(g) is indistinguishable from that made in Frontiero.
32. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975), held that different treatment afforded
men and women with respect to discharge and promotion was constitutionally valid. The
Court recognized that the different treatment was rationally based and did not reflect
"archaic and overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and
female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for
professional service." Id. at 577. Since women had less opportunity for promotion Congress
had a rational basis for allowing them a longer period of tenure in order to put them on par
with men. Since the parties were not similarly situated the case can be distinguished from
Reiser.
33. Cases cited note 7 supra.
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reason for excluding women from the draft. However, the technical
nature of modern warfare reduces the chance of hand-to-hand combat to a bare minimum.- During the Vietnam War less than 2 per
cent of the total military were actually engaged in combat. 4 Since
most positions in the armed forces have nothing to do with strength,
it cannot be authoritatively argued that women are, as a class, unfit
for military service. Other nations, such as Israel, have effectively
incorporated women into their armed services. In that country, the
law requires that every woman, upon reaching the age of 18, must
report for 20 months compulsory service. Most women, although
they receive combat training, are assigned to necessary non-combat
jobs such as electronics, communication and nursing. 5 As evidenced
by the 1967 Six Day War, the inclusion of women in the armed
forces did not dilute the Israeli war effort. Only a small percentage
of armed forces are ever engaged in actual combat in modem warfare.
Even the armed forces themselves recognize the fact that
women can serve effectively. Today 66 of the Navy's 88 job ratings
are open to WAVES. Women can now serve in 434 of the possible
482 positions in the Army. The Air Force and Marines have also
made more fields available to women.3 ' Although, until recently, the
percentage of women who could serve in the armed forces was restricted to 2 per cent, the services are now actively recruiting
women. 7 In 1970, there were 41,183 women in the armed forces; in
1973, there were 55,375; a projected figure of 123,261 is set for 1978.3
With women being actively recruited, there is no justification for
non-conscription should the need arise.
United States v. Dorris39 held that a military classification
based on sex was reasonable in order to "provide for the common
defense" in a manner ". . . which would both maximize the efficiency and minimize the expense of raising an army . . . ." Argu-

ments such as this based upon economics are also untenable. Justice
Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Kahn v. Shevin,40 said that,
"Gender classifications cannot be sustained merely because they
34. R.B. Conlin, Equal Protection Versus Equal Rights Amendment-Where Are We
Now?, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 259, 320 (Winter 1975).
35. 118 Cong. Rec. part 7, S. 9332-9333, March 21, 1972.
36. U.S. News & World Report 75: 82-84, Dec. 10, 1973.
37. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 174, as amended, 10 U.S.C. §
3209(b)(1967); 10 U.S.C. § 5410 (1956) (repealed 1967).
38. See note 36 supra.
39. 319 F. Supp. 1306, 1308 (W.D. Pa. 1970) quoting Preamble to United States Constitution and United States v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621, 623 (7th Cir. 1969).
40. 416 U.S. 351, 358 (1974).
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promote legitimate governmental interests, such as efficacious
administration of government" (emphasis added).4 The Supreme
Court decision in Frontiero, and Reed v. Reed,42 affirmed the
proposition that gender-based classifications solely for administrative convenience cannot stand. If economics is an argument then
there is all the more reason to subject women to the draft. By providing women with the opportunity for military service the government is reducing the job strain on the economy. Military service
training will provide women with educational and vocational skills
which might otherwise be lost. This would put women on an equal
basis with men when they are ready to re-enter the job pool. Such
educational opportunities are a legitimate method of bringing
women into full participation in the political, business, and economic arenas. Since women would be judged on their abilities to
perform rather than on their sex, incentives to compete and achieve
would naturally follow and give women a greater sense of their own
worth. Another benefit of such service would be to provide young
women an alternative to marriage and college."
Other arguments based on women's abilities are also dubious.
The fact that some women would be unable to meet the standards
set up by a conscription act does not thereby afford women protection as a class from a duty concomitant with citizenship. Many men
are also drafted who are eventually turned away because their physical and mental qualifications are unacceptable. Sex-based classifications are unnecessary since neutral nonsexual criteria could be
used to determine those individuals who would satisfy the necessary
standards of performance. The burden is on the legislature to define
more realistic classifications.
James L. Rados
41. See note 25 supra.
42. The Court found that legislation involving men as administrators of estates (a
classification based on sex) did not rest upon any ground "of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
be treated alike." Reed at 76, quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
43. Hale and Kanowitz, Women and the Draft: A Response to Critics of the Equal
Rights Amendment, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 199 (1971).
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